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any reason inadequate, equity will enjoin such interference by a third
party. The court, however, further said, "If a member should volun-
tarily sever his relations with the pool, by breaching his contract, and
withdrawing his membership therein, and placing his tobacco for sale
upon the market, no reason is perceived why appellants should be
denied the privilege of buying his crop," and the injunction granted in
that case was modified in keeping with that idea.
However, that case does not govern in this instance, as in the opin-
ion of the court the Wisconsin Co. aided the Western Co. in the breach
complained of, as due to the continuing character of the contract, there
was an inducement of the breach by the Wisconsin Co. Up to the time
the Western Co. attempted to sell syrup to the Wisconsin Co. it had
not violated its negative covenant. As to this part of the contract, there
was little doubt, at least as far as the court was concerned, but what
the breach was induced by the Wisconsin Co., the only kind of breach
probably with reference to which the plaintiff could obtain equitable
relief.
As long as the Western Co. failed to object to Hustings Co. not
selling the required quantity of product for a number of years, they
could not take advantage of the default after terminating the old con-
tract and making the new one. Furthermore, after requesting that sales
be curtailed, the seller could not object to the agents not pushing the
sales.
The plaintiff's idea of making a substitute for Coca Cola to miti-
gate the damages, was not proper, but in view of the fact that plaintiff
did not manufacture the substitute until after the breach by the
Western Co., it did not make the plaintiff come into court with un-
clean hands. 3 Williston, Contracts, p. 2615, 155 N.Y. 466; 82 Mich.
661.
From this case it appears that if one voluntarily breaches his con-
tract, it is permissible for others to deal with him and purchase goods
which it would be illegal for them to purchase if the contract was in
full force and effect, but if a third party induces such breach, he is
liable either for damages or to an action in equity to enjoin him from
further dealings.
ARNO J. MILLER.
INSURANCE-PARTIES-JOINDER. The proposition that a plaintiff
cannot proceed directly against an Insurance Company under a liability
policy prohibiting action against such insurance company until the
plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the insured is borne out by
the recent case of Fulleylove v. Holmes, et al., 237 N.W. (Wis.). This
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case is in confoimity with a growing line of cases interpreting Sec.
85.93, Wis. Stat. (1929) which provides that an insurance company is
directly liable, under a liability policy, to persons injured by the act of
the insured.
The plaintiff in this case, an infant, was injured by the defendant,
Holmes, while walking along a highway. The suit was brought by his
guardian ad litem, Thomas Fulleylove, who is also his father, against
Albert Holmes and the Constitution Indemnity Company, but, since
Holmes had disappeared, a summons and complaint were only served
on the insurance Company.
The insurance company's answer cited the "no action" clause in
Holmes' policy and declared that Holmes had breached a stipulation of
the policy to the effect that the policy-holder must cooperate with the
insurance company in assisting in the defense of actions arising out of
his acts, by his failure to keep in touch with the company and inform
them of his whereabouts. From a judgment dismissing the complaint,
based on the grounds that Holmes had not cooperated with the insur-
ance company, the plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court but
held for the appellee on the different grounds that the action was
barred by the "no action" clase in the policy.
The appellant in his appeal relied on Elliot v. Indemnity Insurance
Company, 201 Wis. 445, 230 N.W. 87 ,which held the insured was not
a necessary party to the maintenance of the action. The policy in that
case, however, did not contain a "no actions' clause, and that case was
further distinguished from the one being discussed by the fact that the
policyholder was dead and his estate insolvent at the commencement of
the action. Hence, if Sec. 85.93, Wis. Stat. (1929) would not apply,
Sec. 204.30, Wis. Stat. (1929) would.
The case which did apply here was Morgan v. Hunt, 196 Wis. 298,
which held that Sec. 85.93, Wis. Stat. (1929) does not apply to policies
which contain "no action" clauses and in a suit brought under such a
policy-the insurance company may not be joined as a party defendant.
Earlier cases which interpret the statute similarly are Bro v. Stand-
ard Accident Insurance Co., 194, Wis. 293, 215 N.W. 431, and Fanslan
v. Federal Mutual Accident Insurance Co., 194, Wis. 8, 215 N.W. 589.
In the latter case Justice Owens declared: "It was recognized that the
damages for which recovery was sought must be brought within the
terms of the policy'as written. We did not then and do not now'enter-
tain any thought that it was the legislative purpose td deprive the insur-
ance companies of the right to limit their coverage or to issue such
contracts of insurance or indemnity as they may choose."
As for the allegation in the insurance companies answer that Holmes
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breached his agreement in the policy to assist in the defense of actions
arising out of his acts, the Supreme Court declared that there had been
no breach, because the insurance company had never requested Holmes
to assist it.
After the accident he simply gave notice to the insurance company
and disappeared without being requested to give aid, and so, Bachhuber
v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 274, 229 N.W. 117, which held that a provision
for cooperation in defense in a liability policy is a condition precedent
to the maintenance of an action on the policy, did not apply.
CHARLES ROWAN.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-POLICE POWER-ZONING. The City of
La Crosse vs. Elbertson, a Wisconsin case reported in 277 N.W. 99,
although not deciding any particularly new law, is interesting because
it pertains to the right of a municipal corporation under its police
powers to regulate zoning within its boundaries. The case is not radical;
it makes no fresh departures; it evolves no new principles; it merely
applies fundamental rules of municipal and constitutional law. Never-
theless, the case is attractive because it adds to the already somewhat
fecund law of city zoning which in this day of increasing aestheticism
commands immediate and ardent interest.
In this case the defendant appealed from a conviction before a
police justice court in La Crosse of violating the Consolidated Zoning
Ordinance Number 846 by operating a funeral parlor and undertaking
business within a district set aside by the ordinance for residential pur-
poses. The grounds of the appeal were four-fold; namely, (a) that
the provisions of the ordinance were unreasonable and oppressive as to
the defendant and his rights, (b) that the ordinance was void because
it was an amendment to an invalid ordinance, (c) that it provided no
penalty, and (d) that it reserved for the council of the city arbitrary
power.
The court disposed of these arguments in the following manner:
To the first argument it replied, "Under the rules long since estab-
lished, recognized, and set forth in the cases just cited, when municipal
legislative action proceeds from authority expressly granted and such
action is based on apparent reason, the decision of the legislative body
is controlling." The court then proceeded to find that the legislative
body was warranted in zoning as it did in view of the general character
of the surroundifigs, stating that if different conclusions as to just
where the line of the district should be, may be drawn from the evi-
dence submitted, the conclusion adopted by the legislative body cannot
be interfered with as long as that body acted within reason. (State
